Romano v. Rockwell and California's Wrongful Termination Accrual Rule: When Does the Clock Actually Start?

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Last updated: June 2026 — Reflects Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 479, Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp. (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 731, Government Code § 12960, and Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 as current.

Your employer handed you a termination notice in October. You spent the next five months in a company-sponsored transition program, collecting a salary, attending outplacement sessions, negotiating severance, but still employed.

Your last day was March 31. When did the statute of limitations on your wrongful termination claim start running: October or March?

The answer in California is March, and the California Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. is the reason.

This article explains the Romano accrual rule, why it exists, how it operates across the different legal theories available in a California wrongful termination case, and why getting the accrual date wrong is one of the most consequential — and most common — mistakes in employment litigation.

The Problem Romano Solved: Notice vs. Actual Termination

Before Romano, California courts were divided on a threshold question: does the statute of limitations in a wrongful termination case begin running when the employee is told employment will end, or when it actually ends?

The stakes are significant. An employee informed in January that their position is being eliminated, effective the following July, has six months between notice and actual separation. If the clock starts at notice, that six months erodes the filing window without the employee having yet suffered the full injury.

If the clock starts at actual termination, the employee retains the complete filing period from the moment the employment relationship is severed.

The California Supreme Court resolved this question definitively in Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 479. William Romano had been employed by Rockwell International for 29 years when, in December 1988, he was told his employment would be terminated. He continued working and receiving a full salary until his retirement on May 31, 1991.

He filed his complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing in September 1991 — within three years of his actual termination, but nearly three years after the notice of termination.

The California Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of actual termination — not on the date the employee receives unequivocal notice that termination is imminent.

The Romano rule applies to all primary causes of action in a California wrongful termination case: FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims, implied contract claims, and Tameny public policy tort claims.

Why Romano Got It Right: The Injury That Hasn't Happened Yet

The Romano rule reflects a foundational principle of California limitations law: a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers appreciable harm. An employee who has been told their job is ending but who remains employed, receiving compensation, and performing work has not yet suffered the full injury the wrongful termination claim is designed to redress.

The California Supreme Court drew on contract accrual principles to reach this conclusion. Where ongoing contractual obligations exist — an employment relationship involves continuous obligations on both sides — the limitations period does not begin running until the breach is complete.

An unequivocal notice of termination is a repudiation of the employment relationship, but California law allows an employee to elect to continue relying on the contract rather than treating the repudiation as an immediate termination. The statute does not run against the employee who reasonably continues the employment relationship while the employer is still performing.

The policy rationale reinforces the doctrinal analysis. Penalizing employees for remaining employed — for giving the employer time to reconsider, for honoring transition periods, for completing severance negotiations while still on payroll — would create perverse incentives.

Employees would be pressured to walk off the job the moment they received a termination notice in order to preserve their filing window. Romano avoids that outcome.

How the Romano Accrual Rule Applies Across Different Claim Types

Romano addressed three distinct theories simultaneously, and the accrual analysis differs slightly for each.

Claim Type	Accrual Trigger	Governing Authority
FEHA discrimination / retaliation	Date of actual termination	Romano, 14 Cal.4th 479; Gov. Code § 12960
Tameny public policy tort	Date of actual termination	Romano, 14 Cal.4th 479; CCP § 335.1
Implied contract breach	Date of actual termination	Romano, 14 Cal.4th 479; Mullins, 15 Cal.4th 731
Constructive discharge	Date employee resigns	Romano framework applied to resignation date
Anticipatory breach (employee treats notice as final)	Date employee elects to treat repudiation as termination	Romano, 14 Cal.4th at 490

The FEHA claim carries a three-year filing deadline with the California Civil Rights Department under Government Code § 12960, measured from the date of the unlawful practice, which Romano establishes as the date of actual termination for discriminatory firing claims. The Tameny tort claim carries a two-year limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1.

The implied contract breach claim carries a two-year period for oral contracts under Code of Civil Procedure § 339 and a four-year period for written contracts under Code of Civil Procedure § 337. In each case, Romano instructs that the clock starts at actual termination.

Mullins Extended Romano: Constructive Discharge Gets the Same Treatment

The California Supreme Court reinforced and extended the Romano accrual rule in Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp. (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 731.

Mullins involved a constructive discharge — a situation where the employer created conditions so intolerable that the employee resigned. The question was whether the Romano actual-termination rule applied where the termination was not an explicit employer action but rather a forced resignation.

The court held that the Romano rule applies with equal force to constructive discharge: the statute of limitations begins running on the date the employee resigns — the date the employment relationship is actually severed — not on the date the employer began creating the intolerable conditions that eventually led to the resignation.

This extension matters practically. An employee subjected to a systematic campaign of harassment or adverse treatment designed to force a resignation may endure months of deteriorating conditions before finally resigning.

Under Mullins, that employee's filing clock does not begin eroding during the campaign — it begins on the day they leave. The full three-year FEHA window and the full two-year Tameny window run from the resignation date.

The Employee's Election: A Critical Strategic Choice

Romano recognized a situation that courts continue to encounter: an employee who receives unequivocal notice of termination but chooses to continue working during a transition period. Under Romano, this employee has two options.

The first is to treat the notice as the operative event — to accept the employer's repudiation as the effective termination and file immediately based on that date. This option is available but rarely advantageous: the employee is still employed, still receiving compensation, and giving up the benefit of the Romano rule without gaining anything in return.

The second — and Romano-default — option is to continue the employment relationship and let the statute run from actual termination. This is the approach the Romano court endorsed.

An employee who receives a termination notice in January, continues working through June, and files in May of the following year has filed within the limitations period measured from June. The January notice date is irrelevant to the limitations analysis.

The strategic implication is clear: employees who receive advance notice of termination — common in layoffs, restructurings, and position eliminations where employers give 60- or 90-day notices — should not allow concern about filing deadlines to drive premature departure. The Romano rule protects the full filing window from the date employment actually ends.

What Romano Does Not Do: Common Misconceptions

Romano is frequently mischaracterized as a broad "continuing violations" doctrine that tolls or extends filing deadlines whenever discrimination occurs over time. This is inaccurate, and the conflation causes meaningful strategic errors.

Romano does not toll the filing deadline — it defines when it begins. There is a significant difference.

Tolling doctrines (equitable tolling, fraudulent concealment tolling, and the continuing violations doctrine as applied in harassment cases) operate after the clock has started running and pause or extend it. Romano operates before the clock starts, establishing the triggering event as actual termination rather than notice.

Romano also does not apply to discrete discriminatory acts that predate the termination.

An employee who experienced discrimination through biased performance reviews, denied promotions, and pay disparities over several years before finally being terminated cannot use Romano to revive claims based on those earlier acts.

Each discrete discriminatory act has its own accrual date. Romano applies only to the termination claim itself — it sets the accrual date of the termination cause of action at the date employment actually ends.

The doctrine that extends filing windows for ongoing harassment and discrimination — the continuing violations doctrine applied in Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 798 — is a distinct and separate legal principle applicable to hostile work environment claims, not to discrete termination events.

Confusing Romano with the continuing violations doctrine is a common error that leads employees to misanalyze both their deadlines and their available claims. See our California workplace harassment guide for how the continuing violations doctrine operates in that distinct context.

Practical Application: Calculating Your Actual Filing Deadline

If you were terminated and are evaluating whether to pursue a wrongful termination claim, the Romano rule provides the correct starting point for calculating your filing deadline.

Step 1: Identify your actual last day of employment. This is the date Romano uses — not the date you received notice, not the date your employer announced the decision, not the date you signed a termination agreement. It is the last day you were employed.

Step 2: Apply the appropriate limitations period to that date. For FEHA claims (discrimination, harassment, retaliation), you have three years from that date to file with the California Civil Rights Department under Government Code § 12960. For Tameny public-policy tort claims, you have 2 years under CCP § 335.1. For implied contract claims, you have two years (oral) or four years (written) from that date.

Step 3: Identify the shortest applicable window — because multiple claims with different deadlines are typically pursued simultaneously, and the earliest-closing window governs your urgency.

Step 4: Consult counsel well before any deadline. The Romano rule protects the starting point of your filing window, but equitable exceptions are narrow, and deadlines in California employment law are strictly enforced.

For a complete breakdown of all seven statute of limitations clocks that apply to California wrongful termination cases, see our guide on California wrongful termination statutes of limitations.

For the full legal framework on wrongful termination claims — grounds, proof standards, damages, and the CRD filing process — see our California wrongful termination guide.

Frequently Asked Questions

If my employer gave me 90 days notice but kept me on payroll, when does my filing clock start?

Under Romano v. Rockwell, the clock starts on your last actual day of employment — the day the employment relationship was severed — not the day you received the 90-day notice. If your employer gave notice in January and your last day was April 30, your three-year FEHA window runs from April 30 and your two-year Tameny window runs from the same date. The notice date is irrelevant to the limitations calculation.

What if I was constructively discharged — does Romano still apply?

Yes. Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 731 extended the Romano rule to constructive discharge: the statute of limitations runs from the date you resigned, not from the date the employer began creating intolerable conditions. If you endured months of intolerable working conditions before resigning on June 15, your filing clocks run from June 15.

Can I use Romano to revive old discrimination claims that happened years before my termination?

No. Romano establishes when the termination cause of action accrues — it does not revive separate, earlier discriminatory acts. Biased performance reviews, pay disparities, denied promotions, or other discrete adverse actions that occurred before the termination have their own individual accrual dates. Romano does not extend those windows — it applies only to the termination claim itself.

What is the difference between Romano and the continuing violations doctrine?

Romano is an accrual rule — it determines when the statute of limitations clock starts for a termination claim, fixing it at the date of actual termination rather than notice. The continuing violations doctrine is a tolling principle — it applies in harassment and ongoing discrimination cases to allow recovery for acts that fall outside the limitations window when they are part of a continuing course of discriminatory conduct. The two doctrines serve different functions and apply to different claim types. Romano applies to termination; the continuing violations doctrine applies primarily to hostile work environment claims.

My employer told me in writing that my last day was a future date but immediately escorted me from the building. Which date applies?

This is a factual question courts resolve by looking at the substance of the termination rather than its stated form. If the employer's conduct — immediate removal from premises, termination of system access, cessation of work duties — demonstrates that the employment relationship was actually severed on the escort date rather than the stated future date, courts may treat the escort date as the actual termination date for Romano purposes. An employment attorney should evaluate this specific scenario.

Do I need to file with the CRD before I can sue in court for wrongful termination?For FEHA-based claims (discrimination, harassment, retaliation), yes — filing with the California Civil Rights Department and obtaining a right-to-sue notice is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil lawsuit. For Tameny public policy tort claims and implied contract claims, no administrative filing is required. Most California wrongful termination cases involve both FEHA and non-FEHA theories, making the CRD filing essential regardless.

DISCLOSURE This article is published by 1000Attorneys.com, a California State Bar Certified Lawyer Referral and Information Service, LRIS Certificate No. 0128, accredited by the American Bar Association and established in 2005. The information on this page is for general educational purposes only and is not legal advice. 1000Attorneys.com is not a law firm and does not provide legal representation. For legal advice about your specific situation, consult a qualified California attorney.